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Abstract 
Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) have an increasing presence in the global financial ecosystem, 
principally through their investments in equities, which, in turn, may influence HRM. This study 
examines the influence of the world’s largest SWF, the Norwegian Government Pension Fund-Global 
(NGPF-G), on employment in its UK investee firms. We find that firms with NGPF-G investment 
are significantly less likely to reduce their demand for labour, more specifically in the immediate 
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. When a drop in the demand for labour does occur, it is less 
extreme when compared to similar organizations without a NGPF-G shareholding, and this is evident 
even in the case of relatively small NGPF-G investments. These findings are in line with the fund’s 
objective of promoting corporate sustainability and Norwegian values. We draw out the key 
implications of our findings for HR practice. 
 
Keywords: Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF); NGPF-G; Alternative Investors; Employment; 
Downsizing; Ownership; Sustainability; Norway.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There is a growing body of literature that explores the relationship between new or alternative 
categories of investor and human resource (HR) practices adopted by firms (Clark, 2007; Appelbaum, 
Batt, & Clark, 2013; Clark, 2013; Goergen, O’Sullivan, & Wood, 2014a; Gospel & Pendleton, 
2014a). Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) have become an important feature of the global financial 
ecosystem. They are “state owned financial vehicles that administer public funds and invest them” 
(Bahgat, 2010: 163), potentially providing parent governments with future financial stability (Bahgat, 
2010). Although some have been the product of large non-mineral exports, most are founded on the 
export of primary commodities.  Due to their size, the activities of SWFs are expected to have far-
reaching consequences for the economies in which they invest as well as for individual investee 
companies, and their employees. Although emerging types of investor, of which SWFs are one, may 
impact a range of HR practices, of particular concern has been their effect on jobs (Appelbaum & 
Batt, 2014; Gospel & Pendleton, 2014a). This would reflect the extent to which changes in ownership 
may be associated with the aggressive liquidation of physical assets and/or the adoption of strategies 
that treat labour as a readily disposable or substitutable commodity.  Not only may this lead to a loss 
of organizational specific human capital, which raises issues around organizational sustainability, but 
may also cause the disruption of work teams, worsening inequality in the employment relationship 
and the spread of the survivor syndrome.  
 Even though there is quite extensive research on the effects of other categories of alternative 
investor (e.g. venture capital and private equity) on work and employment, little has been written on 
SWFs (for exceptions, see Gospel & Pendleton, 2014a, 2014b), although they feature in wider 
scholarly debates on alternative investors (Appelbaum & Batt, 2014).  This study seeks to redress this 
gap, in generating new quantitative evidence to supplement Gospel and Pendleton’s (2014a) earlier 
qualitative work. Specifically, we investigate the impact of equity ownership by the world’s largest 
SWF  the Norwegian Government Pension Fund-Global (NGPF-G)  on employees in UK listed 
firms. Since no SWF is typical of the category and one cannot reach general conclusions on the likely 
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impact of SWFs on HRM based on the case of a single fund, one can provide evidence as to the level 
of shareholding at which influence may be secured, and the extent to which SWF investments may 
result in visible HR outcomes.  
 We focus on the NGPF-G for several reasons.  First, it is the largest SWF in the world in terms 
of equity investments (SWFI, 2014). Second, it expects investee firms to adhere to basic standards of 
social responsibility, including towards employees (Norges Bank, 2014; Dixon & Monk, 2012). 
Whilst this may make it atypical, it does serve to illustrate the diversity of the alternative investor 
financial ecosystem and the potential for even small investments to have a substantial impact on firms 
and their people. Third, recent years have seen a significant increase in its acquisition of UK listed 
equities which facilitates a “before” and “after” investigation. We structure our research design so 
that we are able to capture NGPF-G’s investments around the recent financial crisis so as to further 
enrich our findings in terms of SWF impact in the context of a significant financial crisis. Fourth, the 
NGPF-G is unique in publishing its ownership stakes in all its investee companies. This is important 
as it allows us to accurately identify UK firms in which the NGPF-G has made an investment and 
when this investment has occurred as well as ensuring we identify a control sample of firms without 
NGPF-G investment. Fifth, during the period of our study the NGPF-G did not invest in firms via 
private equity so we are therefore able to focus exclusively on direct investments.1 Finally, given the 
impact of country of origin on SWF behaviour (Gospel & Pendleton, 2014a), the NGPF-G represents 
a particularly interesting case given that Norway is a social democracy, notable for progressive and 
employee-friendly HR policies (Amable, 2003). 
 Our paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we discuss the relationship between 
investors and HRM and how types of investor, including SWFs, are expected to influence corporate 
behaviour around employment.  In Section 3 we introduce the NGPF-G.  In Section 4 we present our 
sample and explain our research methodology. In Section 5 we discuss our empirical findings while 
                                                 
1
 However, the NGPF-G is open to invest in private equity in the future (Holter & Mohsin, 2016).   
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in Section 6 we discuss the practical HR implications of our findings, identify limitations and suggest 
avenues for further research. 
2. INVESTORS, HRM AND SWFS 
There is a growing body of work linking investor behaviour with work and employment issues.  
Lazonick & O’Sullivan (2000) argue that, in liberal market economies, legislative reforms in the 
1980s and 1990s confirmed the primacy of shareholder value and strengthened the rights of investors 
over those of managers, and, indeed, workers. This has been associated with the empowerment of 
financial intermediaries and alternative investors who are lightly committed to particular industries 
and locales, and the commensurate weakening of the position of workers (Appelbaum et al., 2013).  
Although investors may press their demands through either voice or exit, it is easier for mobile and 
uncommitted investors to exercise the latter route. It can be argued that the influence of SWFs on 
HRM is likely to be indirect and limited, as they are rarely sole owners (Gospel & Pendleton, 2014a), 
and because their investment strategies are passive (Gospel, Haves, Pendleton, Vitols, & Wilke, 
2010).  However, in a climate of low investor commitment, the threat by investors to sell even quite 
small shareholdings can have a significant effect on management, incentivising or discouraging 
specific managerial behaviour (Admati & Pfleiderer, 2009; Jacoby, 2005).    
 A significant body of HR literature suggests that the strengthening of investor rights has 
translated into strong pressure to disseminate more hard-line approaches to HRM, characterized by 
arm’s length contracting, reduced security of tenure, more rigorous monitoring of performance and 
the squeezing of wages and/or the use of variable pay (Thompson, 2011; Collings 2014).  In 
particular, downsizing is often seen as a relatively simple mechanism for boosting the market value 
of the firm (Nixon, Hitt, Lee, Jeong, 2004), often due to an anticipated reduction in costs, even if its 
real effect on financial performance is less obvious (Zyglidopoulos, 2005).  Although it could be 
argued that alternative investors have broadly similar agendas, and are particularly keen to press for 
job cuts and generally more hard-line HR policies (Appelbaum & Batt, 2014), others have suggested 
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that the alternative investor ecosystem is quite diverse, and those with longer time horizons may 
favour human capital development over radical job cuts (Wood, 2015).  Indeed, the recent experience 
of Sports Direct would suggest that investor pressure can potentially have positive effects on HRM.  
In this case, an adverse reaction by several institutional investors in 2016 following labour scandals 
has resulted in promises of better practice.  A year prior to the scandals, the NGPF-G raised concerns 
as to poor labour practices amongst Sports Direct’s suppliers (Milne, 2015) and consequently asked 
Sports Direct to improve their reporting on labour related issues. Moreover, given that the NGPF-G’s 
raison d’être is inter-generational savings of foreign exchange windfalls from North Sea oil and gas 
(Bahgat, 2010), some SWFs may have more of an interest in long-term HR policies than, say, hedge 
funds, whose time horizons are often extremely short-term.  
 Although SWFs may potentially impact on many HR policies and practices, their effect on the 
demand for labour is arguably, along with reward systems, the most important, in that it impacts on 
the relative willingness of firms to invest in people, on employee commitment to the firm, and the 
durability of collective identities and representation (c.f. Goergen, Brewster, & Wood, 2009; Kelly, 
1998). Although SWFs have traditionally focused on a longer-term horizon than hedge funds or 
private equity, Gospel and Pendleton (2014a) suggest this may be changing. Such a trend towards 
greater short-termism would leave workers worse off. Again, Appelbaum and Batt (2014) argue that 
SWFs are often interpenetrated with other new categories of activist investor, notably private equity, 
with a focus on value release rather than organizational sustainability; however, their study primarily 
focuses on private equity, and their discussion on SWFs is at the conceptual level.     
 Theoretically, the potential impact of SWFs on employment is complex and depends largely on 
the specific SWF.  SWF investment may help the position of employees through the provision of 
much needed capital infusions to struggling firms (Gospel, Pendleton, Vitols, & Wilke, 2011). 
However, SWF involvement may also lead to job cuts and insecurity (Moeller, 2009). Gospel and 
Pendleton (2014a: 27) suggest that the strategies of SWFs and other “new investment funds” will be 
moulded by country of domicile and, in liberal market economies such as the UK, there will be greater 
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room to introduce more hardline HR policies. Of course, in the case of the NGPF-G, country of 
domicile influences would be expected to include a long-term and sustainable perspective as well as 
an inclination to countenance greater employee-employer interdependence through greater 
investment in people and lower staff turnover rates than other types of investors and SWFs (Gospel 
& Pendleton, 2014a; Goergen, O’Sullivan, & Wood, 2014b). Of course, it may be that SWF 
investment has no discernible impact. Indeed, prior case study evidence suggests minimal influence 
by SWFs on wages, working conditions and employee voice (Wilke, Vitols, Haves, Gospel, & Voss, 
2009; Gospel et al., 2010). In a case study of the effects of the Dubai SWF linked Dubai Ports World’s 
acquisition of P&O, Gospel et al. (2011) found few effects on employment, but noted minor, albeit 
detrimental, changes in voice and pensions. The objective of this study is to provide empirical insights 
where there currently are few and in doing so to address many of the points raised above by 
investigating the impact of equity ownership of one prominent SWF, the NGPF-G, on employment 
in UK listed firms. Specifically, our main research question is whether NGPF-G investments in UK 
listed companies have an impact on the demand for labour by these firms.  We focus on NGPF-G 
investments in the UK to ensure our findings are not influenced by different employment-related 
legislation in different countries.    
3. THE NORWEGIAN GOVERNMENT PENSION FUND-GLOBAL (NGPF-G) 
The Norwegian Government Pension Fund-Global (NGPF-G) is a sovereign wealth fund where the 
surplus wealth produced by Norwegian petroleum income is held. Despite its name, the NGPF-G is 
not a pension fund, but could help fund state pensions.  The NGPF-G is the largest SWF in the world, 
owning approximately 1.2% of all globally listed securities and approximately 2.5% of all European 
listed securities (Norges Bank Investment Management, 2013). The Norwegian Ministry of Finance 
manages it, with operational management being delegated to Norges Bank Investment Management, 
a subsidiary of the Norwegian Central Bank (Ainina & Mohan, 2010).  
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 The Norwegian Ministry of Finance regularly publicises its expectations and excludes firms from 
investment: this includes all weapons manufacturers, those who transact with such manufacturers, 
firms whose activities negatively impact on human rights, and those who engage in corruption and 
other violations of ethical norms or “severe environmental degradation” (Reiche, 2010: 3572).  In 
addition to arms manufacturers, tobacco manufacturers and palm oil producers have been excluded, 
as well as Walmart for labour issues (Pier, 2007; Dixon & Monk, 2012) and Cairn and Kosmos for 
ethical issues (Milne & Kiran, 2016). From 2012 to 2014, the NGPF-G divested from 114 companies 
(Milne, 2015). In addition to exiting, the Fund has voted against 15% of board recommendations at 
annual shareholder meetings, including the re-election of Jamie Dimon, CEO of JP Morgan and Lloyd 
Blankfein, chairman of Goldman Sachs, as well as the issue of new preference shares by BMW 
(Milne, 2015; see also Sandbu, 2016; Financial Times, 2016).  This suggests that, even with relatively 
small ownership stakes, the NGPF-G is very willing to make its views known and expects them to be 
listened to.  The core focus of this research is on whether the NGPF-G does affect the demand for 
labour by its target firms, and what this effect is. 
4. SAMPLE SELECTION AND METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Sample Selection 
Since the objective of our study is to investigate the impact of ownership by the NGPF-G on the 
demand for labour by its target companies, we construct a panel of data, i.e. a cross-section repeated 
over a number of years, including years preceding the NGPF-G investment and years with NGPF-G 
investment. We first identify which UK listed companies had such investment. We obtain the list of 
UK firms with NGPF-G investment from the NGPF-G’s website. We then check whether these firms 
are incorporated in mainland UK, excluding firms from the Channel Islands and UK overseas 
territories. We also exclude investment trusts. We arrive at 508 firms with NGPF-G ownership for at 
least one year over the period of 2006-2013. 
The second task is to identify a suitable control group of non-NGPF-G targets to enable reliable 
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comparisons to be made. This is achieved as follows. First, we review existing studies that have 
investigated the likelihood of SWF investment. Sojli and Tham (2011) and Kotter and Lel (2011) 
suggest that SWF investment is more likely in larger firms (market capitalization, turnover and assets) 
as well as firms with higher sales growth (sales growth); higher growth opportunities (market-to-book 
ratio); greater accounting performance (return on assets); greater levels of cash (cash as a proportion 
of total assets); lower levels of short-term debt (short-term debt as a proportion of total assets); and 
higher dividend payments (dividend yield). Second, we collect data on each of these variables for all 
UK listed firms in the year immediately preceding the NGPF-G investment from Datastream. The 
definition of these variables as well as those of the other variables used in this study can be found in 
Table A in the Appendix. Third, we winsorize the variables at the 10% and 90% percentiles to reduce 
the impact of outliers. Fourth, we utilise propensity score matching (PSM) to match each target firm 
with a non-target firm (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). We run a logit regression based on the 
observations from the year preceding the first year of NGPF-G investment for the 508 firms that were 
targets of NGPF-G investment during the period of our study and observations for all non-NGPF-G 
target firms. The dependent variable is an indicator variable indicating the first year of NGPF-G 
investment. All independent variables are measured in the previous year, i.e. with a lag of one. This 
logit provides us with a propensity score for all firms and we use the nearest neighbour approach to 
identify suitable matches. We specify a maximum caliper distance of 0.1 to reduce bias by minimising 
systematic differences between the matches. Fifth, we only seek nearest neighbour scores for control 
firms in the same industry (using the FTSE industrial classification) and year as the target.2 Thus we 
match targets in terms of propensity score but also preserve the industrial closeness of our targets to 
the non-target matches. This procedure allows us to successfully match 111 of the 508 targets. The 
pre-matching logit is reported in column (1) of Table B in the Appendix. The logit has a high pseudo-
R2 with a value of 0.332 and most of the independent variables have statistically significant 
                                                 
2
  We transform the propensity scores obtained from the previous step via the following formula: Amended Propensity 
Score = Year * 100 + Industry Code * 10 + Propensity Score. 
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coefficients. Finally, to confirm the quality of our matching we proceed as follows. First, we re-run 
the logit underlying the PSM on the matched sample. As expected, the post-matching logit (see 
column (2) of Table B in the Appendix) has little explanatory power as its pseudo-R2 is close to zero 
and the coefficients on the independent variables are insignificant, except for one which is just about 
significant at the 10% level. Second, we use mean and median comparisons to test for differences 
between the targets and matched non-targets for each of the explanatory variables included in our 
propensity score logit regression. We fail to identify any statistically significant differences between 
the two samples (see Table 1); hence, we are confident that our matching is of good quality. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
4.2 Method 
Since our aim is to assess the effects on employment of NGPF-G ownership in the target firms, 
including possible workforce downsizing, we estimate a labour demand equation. Our equation is 
based on Nickell (1984; see also Conyon, Girma, Thompson, & Wright, 2002; Goergen et al., 2014b). 
Subject to several assumptions (see e.g. Goergen et al., 2014b), the demand for labour for a given 
firm is a function of its expected output quantity and the ratio of the expected wage rate to the firm’s 
expected cost of capital. It can be expressed as follows: 
    (1) 
where Lit is the quantity of labour (the natural logarithm of the number of employees) for firm i in 
year t; wit is the real wage rate relative to the firm’s cost of capital (the natural logarithm of real 
wages); Qit is real output over value added (proxied by real turnover as per Nickell, Wadhwani, & 
Wall, 1992); γi is unobservable (firm) fixed effects; ηt is a time varying error term common to all 
firms and εit is an error term that varies across time and firms. We estimate the above equation 
adopting a difference-in-differences (DID) approach. The aim of the DID approach is to determine 
what effect NGPF-G investment has on the demand for labour while allowing for possible intrinsic 
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differences in labour demand between NGPF-G target firms and non-NGPF-G target firms. Such 
intrinsic differences may arise if the matching process has omitted important variables. In other 
words, our DID approach adjusts for differences between the NGPF-G target firms and the non-target 
firms that may remain after the PSM. 
 We add the following variables to equation (1) in order to perform the above-mentioned DID 
analysis.3 First, our key variable is NGPF-G Ownershipit, the percentage of ownership held by NGPF-
G in firm i in year t. This variable measures the effect of NGPF-G’s investment on employment. 
Second, we add the following three indicator variables. Target Firmi is set to one if firm i has NGPF-
G investment during at least one year of the period of study, and zero otherwise. This indicator 
variable measures the employment effects affecting target firms independent of the NGPF-G 
investment. Control Firmi is the equivalent indicator variable for the non-target firms. To avoid 
perfect colinearity, the constant is omitted from the regressions. The third indicator variable, NGPF-
G Yearit, is set to one for firm-year observations with NGPF-G investment. It is also set to one for the 
same years for the equivalent non-target firm. It is set to zero otherwise. This indicator variable 
accounts for possible employment effects affecting both target firms and control firms during years 
with NGPF-G investment. This variable would pick up industry-wide employment effects (and/or 
any other effects pertaining to other firm characteristics) that affect all firms in that industry (and/or 
with the same firm characteristic) at a particular time (i.e. the years with NGPF-G investment) and 
that are not due to NGPF-G investment itself. Finally, some regressions include NGPF-G Ownership 
* Year 2009 (No NGPF-G Ownership * Year 2009) instead of NGPF-G Ownership. This is the 
interaction between NGPF-G Ownership (No NGPF-G Ownership, i.e. a dummy variable set to one 
if there is no NGPF-G ownership in year t, and set to zero otherwise) and the year 2009 dummy 
                                                 
3
  This is effectively a double DID, combining both a cross-sectional and a time-series DID (see Roberts and Whited, 
2013). 
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variable.4 The two interaction terms measure the differential effect of NGPF-G ownership and its 
absence, respectively, on employment in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.5  
 The augmented equation (1) is a dynamic equation as it includes the lagged dependent variable 
(i.e. Li,t-1) on the right-hand side and is estimated for a panel of data, i.e. a cross-section repeated over 
the years 2006 to 2013. Two econometric challenges arise (Abdallah, Goergen, & O’Sullivan, 2015). 
First, the presence of unobservable fixed effects causes the error term in an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression to be correlated with the explanatory variables. Hence, the OLS estimates of 
coefficients on the explanatory variables will not be consistent, i.e. they will be biased and the bias 
will not be reduced by increasing the sample size. Second, the coefficient on the lagged dependent 
variable will be upward biased as the lagged dependent variable will be correlated with the 
unobservable fixed effects. A way forward is to estimate the equation using a fixed-effects or within 
groups (WG) regression procedure. This procedure takes the time mean from each variable’s 
observation, including the dependent and independent variables, and then estimates the regression 
based on the demeaned variables. As they are assumed to be time invariant, the WG procedure 
effectively eliminates the unobservable fixed effects. However, it also generates a biased estimate of 
the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. In contrast to OLS, the estimated coefficient is 
downward biased.  
 A way forward is to use a system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator (Blundell 
and Bond, 1998). This estimator is based on an instrumental variable approach using two types of 
equations and internal instruments: equations in levels using the lagged differences of the dependent 
and independent variables as instruments and equations in first differences using the lagged levels of 
the dependent and independent variables as instruments. The estimated coefficient on the lagged 
                                                 
4
  An earlier version of the paper reported regression results including NGPF-G Ownership Post-crisis, i.e. the interaction 
between NGPF-G Ownership and an indicator variable that equals one for the years 2009-2013, and zero otherwise. 
This variable picks up any differential effect of NGPF-G investment on employment following the 2008 financial crisis. 
NGPF-G Ownership Pre-crisis is the equivalent for the pre-crisis period. NGPF-G Ownership Post-crisis was found to 
be positive and significant whereas NGPF-G Ownership Pre-crisis was not found to be   significant. 
5
  We focus on the year 2009 for the following reason. The annual unemployment rate in the UK increased from 5.7% in 
2008 to 7.6% in 2009. It then remained at around that level until 2013 inclusive. See: 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peoplenotinwork/unemployment/timeseries/mgsx/lms. 
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dependent variable is likely somewhere between the upward biased OLS and the downward biased 
WG coefficient estimates. In what follows, we report the regression results from all three estimation 
techniques.  
5. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports the NGPF-G investments across time (Panel A) and across industries (Panel B). The 
table is based on the 111 target firms from the PSM. The average and median stake is around 2%, 
with the maximum just below 9%. NGPF-G’s investments are most frequent in firms operating in the 
consumer services and industrial sectors.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
5.2 Regression analysis 
Table 3 reports the results for the OLS (columns (1) to (3)), the WG (columns (4) to (6)) and the 
system GMM (columns (7) to (9)) regressions. Regressions (1), (4) and (7) include NGPF-G 
Ownership whereas the remaining regressions include the interaction between NGPF-G Ownership 
and Year 2009 as well as the interaction between No NGPF-G Ownership and Year 2009. Again, the 
two interaction terms measure the effect of NGPF-G ownership and its absence, respectively, on the 
demand for labour in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.  
 As expected, with one exception6 the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is greatest for 
OLS and lowest for WG, and somewhere in between the two for system GMM. The coefficients on 
Target Firmi and Control Firmi are significant (at the 5% level or better) in all the regressions and of 
a similar size.7 This suggests that there are no differences in the demand for labour between the target 
                                                 
6
  For regressions (2) and (8), the coefficient from the system GMM regression is slightly higher than the coefficient 
from the OLS regression. 
7
 Being time-invariant, both variables are differenced away in the WG regressions. 
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firms and the control firms, independent of NGPF-G investment, alleviating concerns about possible 
selection issues. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 Further, the coefficient on NGPF-G Ownership is positive and significant (at the 10% level or 
better) in all three regressions that include this variable. More importantly, NGPF-G Ownership * 
Year 2009 is not significant while No NGPF-G Ownership * Year 2009 is significant at the 1% level 
and negative. This suggests that firms with NGPF-G ownership do not reduce their demand for labour 
in the immediate aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. In contrast, firms without NGPF-G ownership 
in 2009 reduce their demand for labour during that same year, as a reaction to the 2008 financial 
crisis. The significant and negative coefficient corresponds to a decline in employment of between 
33.0% (column (8)) and 33.9% (column (2)). 
 We also include variables measuring the ownership by various types of largest shareholder (with 
very few exceptions this is not the NGPF-G), i.e. the state, families, pension funds, venture 
capitalists/private equity houses, industrial companies, or other types of shareholder, or own treasury 
shares.8 Generally, the ownership by the largest shareholder does not influence the demand for labour 
as the coefficient on this variable is not significant in any of the regressions. However, there is 
evidence that the type of largest shareholder matters: for the government and pension funds, we 
observe a significant and negative effect in a number of regressions. While the number of firm-year 
observations with pension funds as the largest shareholder is too small to draw any meaningful 
conclusions, the government only emerges as the largest shareholder in the financial institutions it 
rescued because of the 2008 financial crisis. We also observe a significant and negative effect if the 
largest stake in the firm is held in the form of treasury shares. Treasury shares are the result of share 
repurchases. One of the motivations for share repurchases is the management’s belief that the firm’s 
                                                 
8
 See Table C in the Appendix for details of the ultimate largest shareholders in our sample firms. There are 363 NGPF-
G target firms in 2012, but data on the ultimate largest shareholder is available for only 262 of these firms. 
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shares are undervalued. Such undervaluation may be combined with downsizing of the workforce. 
However, this would suggest mere correlation rather than causation.  
 To sum up, we find evidence that the NGPF-G prevented a drop in the demand for labour in the 
aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. Importantly, there is no evidence that firms with NGPF-G 
investment had excess demand for labour during the period of study of 2006 to 2013. Does NGPF-G 
ownership ultimately have a negative effect on firm profitability given that it reduces potential 
workforce downsizing? To answer this question, we regress (not tabulated) profit over turnover on 
the same variable measured in the previous year, NGPF-G ownership, Target Firmi, and NGPF-G 
Yearit, and year and industry dummies. We find that NGPF-G ownership has no effect on firm 
performance.  
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our study confirms that alternative investors have far reaching consequences for HRM (Appelbaum 
& Batt, 2014; Appelbaum et al., 2013). Our findings confirm that a reduced demand for labour does 
not necessarily lead to higher returns so activist investors who base their business models on such 
assumptions are likely to be disappointed.  We find that SWF investments, even when relatively 
small, can have a significant effect on the HR practices of investee firms, specifically in relation to 
the demand for labour.   
 However, SWFs are diverse and the impact of other SWFs on employment may be quite different.  
For example, prior work on Gulf SWFs in the UK has reported negligible or detrimental effects 
(Gospel & Pendleton, 2014a). Theoretically, our study highlights the need for viewing alternative 
investors within the context of the institutional domains in which they are nested (c.f. Jacoby, 2005).  
In other words, the policies alternative investors seek to impose will reflect, at least, in part, their 
country of origin’s institutional environment.  Although the literature on comparative capitalism 
assumes that owner agendas will follow on contextual dynamics, it only accords limited attention to 
differences in investor categories, and the extent to which some are more likely to concur or actively 
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seek to reinforce a particular national model than others (c.f. Wood, Dibben, & Ogden, 2014).  There 
is an extensive body of HR literature that looks at country of origin and domicile effects on the firm 
itself, but not its owners (Ferner, Almond, Colling, & Edwards, 2005; Ferner et al., 2011; Brewster, 
Wood, & Brookes, 2008). Our study reveals strong country of origin pressures from owners which 
have the effect of supplementing national level regulation. An important agenda for future research 
would be to provide a more integrated understanding of contextual effects on both owners and firms.  
 Our findings suggest three key implications for the practice of HRM.  First, there is not 
necessarily a relationship between employment and job security, and organizational 
performance/efficiency.  In other words, employers – and HR managers – that promote lean staffing 
(and, by implication, an associated atmosphere of insecurity) in pursuit of an enhanced bottom line 
may be pursuing a fool’s gold. Secure workforces are more likely to be committed to the firm, and, 
hence, have greater incentives to enhance their organization-specific (as opposed to immediately 
externally marketable) human capital. This would offset any benefits that might accrue from a 
reduced wage bill, the disciplinary power imparted by insecurity, and numerical flexibility. It is 
important for HR managers to recognize the constrictions and opportunities flowing from different 
categories of owner (c.f. Bushee, 2004).  Moreover, workers who are more secure in their jobs are 
more likely to voice any concerns, rather than seek redress via the external labour market. This may 
make for better communication and easier resolution of areas of dispute. 
 Second, if the optimal HR strategy varies according to locale and sector, then firms that wish to 
provide high levels of security of tenure, in order to incrementally build and husband organization-
specific knowledge and capabilities, would do well to attract investments from the NGPF-G.  In turn, 
the NGPF-G has shunned controversial industries and firms associated with low labour standards. 
There is evidence that a number of differing institutional investors have begun to take employee well-
being more seriously and are translating this into investment choices (CIPD, 2016). 
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 Third, whilst it is often assumed that a relatively small stake by an alternative investor will have 
minimal effects on HRM, our findings suggest otherwise. The NGPF-G is generally more likely to 
sustain employment than many other alternative investors (c.f. Appelbaum et al., 2013).  This 
suggests that HR managers – and trade unionists – need to deepen their understanding of the nature 
and behavioural patterns of new investor categories, keep abreast of changes in their firm’s 
shareholding, and develop policy options to respond to the latter. As Jacoby (2005) notes, in contexts 
with highly mobile investors, HR managers need to be aware of the likely agendas imposed or 
encouraged by specific investors, and react accordingly. Although it is often held that greater owner 
activism may leave workers worse off, it is evident that the converse can also be true. Although this 
study focuses on jobs, maintaining/reducing the demand for labour is not the only behaviour that has 
an impact on HRM. SWF investment may, for example, also impact on rewards and pensions (Gospel 
& Pendleton, 2014a, 2014b). Therefore, this constitutes a limitation of our study.   
 Whilst NGPF-G investment may not lead to higher levels of overall employment, our results 
suggest that it reduces proclivity to engage in downsizing. However, it is less clear how this comes 
about.  Further research should investigate the methods through which an SWF, such as the NGPF-
G, actually seeks to influence corporate behaviour, although implicit threats of exit are likely to exert 
a strong influence.  For example, in the case of the NGPF-G it may be due to managers being aware 
of the NGPF-G’s reputation for promoting Norwegian values and aligning their firm’s actions 
accordingly. The NGPF-G is an explicitly ethical SWF.  However, there is no evidence that SWFs 
from dictatorships with poor human rights track records would have any interest in labour standards. 
This study could be extended to include other SWFs and provide a broader picture of this expected 
diversity of the impact on HR practice of other SWFs.   
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Table 1: Characteristics of target firms and control firms 
 
 Target firms Control firms   
 Mean Median Mean Median t-test for 
diff. in 
means 
z-test for diff. in 
medians 
Ln(Market 
Capitalisation) 
13.72 12.72 13.68 12.66 -0.102 0.064 
Ln(Sales) 11.62 11.82 11.56 11.59 -0.284 -0.655 
Ln(Total 
Assets) 
13.84 12.83 13.75 12.92 -0.238 -0.347 
Sales Growth 2.92 2.99 2.72 2.75 -1.431 -1.441 
Market-to-
Book Ratio 
-0.02 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.672 0.466 
Return on 
Assets 
9.21 9.21 9.21 9.21 0.485 -0.301 
Ln(Cash over 
Total Assets) 
2.23 2.39 2.13 2.37 -0.617 -0.503 
Ln(ST Debt 
over Total 
Assets) 
1.14 0.98 1.01 0.74 -0.997 -1.144 
Dividend 
Yield 
0.97 1.14 0.92 1.02 -0.477 -0.496 
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Table 2: NGPF-G ownership across time and across sectors 
 
Panel A: Ownership distribution across time 
Year N Mean Median Min Max 
2006 2 1.08 1.08 0.58 1.58 
2007 46 0.38 0.14 0.01 2.04 
2008 39 1.00 0.96 0.06 2.88 
2009 46 1.57 1.35 0.01 4.68 
2010 52 2.03 1.49 0.01 5.81 
2011 51 2.56 2.33 0.02 8.07 
2012 49 2.40 2.29 0.02 7.54 
2013 79 1.91 1.73 0.01 8.53 
Panel B: Ownership distribution across industries 
 N % Cumulative % 
Basic Materials 7 6.31 6.31 
Consumer Goods 7 6.31 12.61 
Consumer Services 24 21.62 34.23 
Financials 15 13.51 47.75 
Health Care 9 8.11 55.86 
Industrials 27 24.32 80.18 
Oil & Gas 6 5.41 85.59 
Technology 12 10.81 96.40 
Telecommunications 3 2.70 99.10 
Utilities 1 0.90 100.00 
Total 111 100.00  
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 Table 3: Labour demand equation – OLS regression, WG regressions and system GMM regressions 
 
  OLS   Within Groups   System GMM  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Log(Employees t-1) 0.947*** 0.944*** 0.948*** 0.692*** 0.794*** 0.746*** 0.906*** 0.953*** 0.939*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
          
Log(Remuneration over 
Employees t) 
-0.162** -0.177** -0.162** -0.143* -0.184** -0.138* -0.263** -0.258* -0.244* 
(0.020) (0.015) (0.020) (0.072) (0.031) (0.072) (0.045) (0.052) (0.071) 
          
Log(Remuneration over 
Employees t-1) 
0.091 0.098 0.093 0.013 0.048 0.075 0.095 0.069 0.126 
(0.194) (0.164) (0.186) (0.864) (0.386) (0.353) (0.535) (0.513) (0.366) 
          
Log(Turnover over Employees 
t) 
-0.082 -0.094* -0.087 -0.081 -0.094 -0.084 0.033 0.004 0.038 
(0.152) (0.088) (0.136) (0.197) (0.127) (0.196) (0.550) (0.944) (0.527) 
Log(Turnover over Employees 
t-1) 
0.074 0.077 0.074 0.062 0.090* 0.064 -0.026 0.012 -0.046 
(0.181) (0.150) (0.189) (0.252) (0.094) (0.270) (0.640) (0.856) (0.442) 
Target Firm 0.876*** 0.696*** 0.967***    1.154** 1.090** 0.923** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    (0.027) (0.017) (0.033) 
          
Control Firm 0.869*** 0.664*** 0.949***    1.154** 1.180*** 0.914** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    (0.017) (0.005) (0.017) 
          
NGPF-G Ownership 0.026**   0.032**   0.043*   
(0.020)   (0.012)   (0.089)   
          
NGPF-G Ownership *  
Year 2009 
 0.027 0.037  0.025 0.013  0.087 0.068 
 (0.429) (0.290)  (0.445) (0.693)  (0.201) (0.236) 
No NGPF-G Ownership * 
Year 2009 
 -0.083*** -0.100***  -0.089*** -0.087***  -0.110*** -0.105*** 
 (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
          
NGPF-G Year -0.033*  -0.014 -0.007  0.046*** -0.060  -0.035 
 (0.079)  (0.362) (0.722)  (0.009) (0.267)  (0.419) 
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  OLS   Within Groups   System GMM  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Ownership Largest 
Shareholder 
-0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 -0.002 
(0.266) (0.601) (0.210) (0.175) (0.981) (0.484) (0.558) (0.291) (0.689) 
          
UO State -0.080** -0.084*** -0.082*** -0.123*** -0.075*** -0.084** -0.810 0.846 -0.900 
 (0.024) (0.009) (0.009) (0.001) (0.008) (0.010) (0.402) (0.551) (0.369) 
          
UO Family -0.027 -0.020 -0.027 -0.023 -0.031 -0.022 -0.068 -0.080 -0.062 
 (0.288) (0.388) (0.290) (0.355) (0.157) (0.364) (0.410) (0.502) (0.436) 
          
UO Pension -0.024 -0.023 -0.026 -0.070** -0.055* -0.064* -0.032 -0.143* -0.018 
 (0.297) (0.299) (0.277) (0.045) (0.089) (0.075) (0.752) (0.100) (0.829) 
UO VC/PE -0.034 -0.019 -0.036 0.001 0.043 0.015 0.297 0.063 0.229 
 (0.346) (0.668) (0.346) (0.979) (0.415) (0.697) (0.190) (0.785) (0.315) 
UO Industrial -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.038 -0.027 -0.022 -0.014 -0.217* -0.015 
 (0.746) (0.718) (0.769) (0.397) (0.472) (0.604) (0.912) (0.098) (0.907) 
          
UO Others -0.019 -0.026 -0.042 -0.013 -0.061 -0.066 3.621 0.234 2.490-- 
 (0.527) (0.417) (0.161) (0.787) (0.232) (0.202) (0.571) (0.968) (0.651) 
          
UO Own Treasury Shares -0.015 -0.048 -0.135*** -0.042 -0.115* -0.158*** 0.437 -0.166 0.116 
(0.611) (0.482) (0.001) (0.200) (0.063) (0.003) (0.465) (0.743) (0.817) 
          
Constant − − − 2.595*** 1.943*** 2.059*** − − − 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
          
Year dummies Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No 
          
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 971 1165 971 971 1165 971 971 1165 971 
          
Adjusted R2 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.684 0.696 0.675 − − − 
          
F 209.82 5.97 243.57 138.70 233.61 138.20 − − − 
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  OLS   Within Groups   System GMM  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
m1 
(p-value) 
 
3.80 
(0.000) 
3.35 
(0.001) 
3.57 
(0.000) 
0.17 
(0.000) 
0.24 
(0.000) 
0.16 
(0.000) 
-1.16 
(0.248) 
-3.49 
(0.129) 
-1.41 
(0.157) 
m2 
(p-value) 
-0.38 
(0.705) 
0.39 
(0.696) 
-0.15 
(0.878) 
 
-0.11 
(0.000) 
0.04 
(0.006) 
-0.11 
(0.000) 
-0.96 
(0.338) 
-0.91 
(0.363) 
-0.75 
(0.452) 
Sargan test 
(p-value) 
− − − − − − 46.66 
(0.718) 
78.83 
(0.004) 
59.04 
(0.132) 
          
Hansen test 
(p-value) 
− − − − − − 56.04 
(0.362) 
55.74 
(0.236) 
58.62 
(0.140) 
 
The system GMM regressions consist of two types of equations: the equations in levels with the first-differenced dependent and independent variables as instruments 
and the first-differenced equations with the dependent and independent variables lagged t-3 as instruments. m1 and m2 are tests for first-order and second-order 
serial correlation in the residuals and asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. The Sargan and Hansen statistics are tests of over-
identified instruments. All regressions contain year dummies. The OLS and system GMM regressions also contain industry dummies. p-values in parentheses. * p 
< 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0. 
